The Air Force is approaching the 80-year anniversary, still searching for an identity, for a way to define what its force looks like, what it really offers the joint force.

Yes, there has been 8th Air Force and SAC, the Wolfpack and the fighters of Rolling Thunder, smart planes and dumb bombs, then laser-guided bombs, JDAMS, stealth and Air Dominance. But none of that defines what the Air Force offers. They are simply tools of the trade.

When you ask the Navy what they offer, they will talk in terms of Carrier Battle Groups with a certain mix of ships, aircraft, and personnel. The Army will talk in Divisions, Brigade Combat Teams, and the required mix of personnel to sustain such a force. Both ask you want you need, and they'll present a force structure. If you ask the Air Force, it will offer a UTC, which in the big scheme of things means nothing, defines nothing. The Air Force can't decide what its force looks like, what it really offers to the fight besides tools and technical wizardry. And it is killing the force one squadron at a time.

Airpower is inherently flexible, and Airmen want to be contributors to the joint fight. But that desire to participate and demonstrate flexibility has made it nearly impossible to define what its force should look like. We talk in terms of targets, tons of cargo, and 4-ships. We then talk about new tech, stealth, sensor fusion, and weapons capabilities. But seldom does the Air Force talk about required force structure to do its job. Enamored with the next tech, we are more than willing to sacrifice numbers because we've never really defined what our 'division' or 'carrier battle group' looks like, and what they can do at full strength.

The squadron is often considered the basic fighting unit of the Air Force, but what does that mean? What do I get when I buy a squadron? Beyond a specific mission, what level of force is involved? And does that come with 12, 15, 18, 21 or 24 aircraft? All doctrinally unknown.

Beyond squadrons, what does force presentation look like? In a major theater war, or even in a Red Flag, we package to address the specific targets, specific threats, protect certain assets, provide the right support. Yet as a whole, we have been historically unable to define what that force looks like. And it is killing the force, one squadron at at time.

The Air Force historically loses budget wars. We are forced to trim the size of squadrons, sacrifice capacity for hopes of new tech because we can't afford both and can't justify both.

Before the Air Force plunges into force irrelevance, it would do well to define what it is, what an Air Force looks like, and what it provides the Joint Force besides tech and a UTC.