For anyone whose spent time around fighter aircraft, especially since the mid-90s, Industry and advocates alike have focused on what generation an aircraft is to measure its capabilities against tactical/operational requirements.  While this can be helpful, there are many flaws in the logic and it has caused the US to waste resources chasing science instead of capabilities and survivability/lethality. 

For starters, the commonly accepted language is that we are right now fielding ‘5th generation’ fighters.  For most, that means minimized radar cross sections (stealth), advanced materials, datalinks, and multi-spectral sensors integrated avionics.  Aircraft that don’t have these capabilities are deemed of lessor lethality, lessor survivability, and a waste of taxpayer dollars.  For example, an F-15EX is deemed by many in the Air Force as a waste of money because it can’t go toe to toe with an integrated, advanced air defense system like that of China.  Aircraft with years under their belt and additional shortcomings in the ‘defined list’ of 5th generation qualities are even less appealing and should be jettisoned immediately.  This is a shortsighted and narrow view of the world of air combat and has caused us to chase our tail and burn budgets to focus on a few characteristics of combat aircraft. 

To be clear, we need stealth.  We need sensor fusion.  We need to capitalize on advance materials.  And we need integrated avionics to assist crews and decision-makers to make lethal choices in aerial combat.  But we need so much more, and time and again we’ve proven that the Swiss Army Knife approach to everything yields little in terms of capacity and seldom hits the mark for overall warfighting requirements and options.  Let’s consider a few other options that matter beyond stealth and advanced materials.

1.         Speed of fielding.  For the ‘pacing competitor’, we must be able to produce aircraft at greater than the speed of attrition, greater than the speed of the enemy.  When every asset is the gold watch, it will never happen.  Even at the fastest production speeds, we cannot produce enough aircraft to deter and fight an enemy like China.  Imagine if during World War II, we had thrown all our resources behind the P-51—clearly the best fighter of the war—and ceased production of the P-47, P-38, P-40 and so many other fighters.  We would have lost the air battle. 

2.         Weapons load.  Internal carriage aircraft—a quality of most low observable aircraft—limits severely the payload of those aircraft.  Yes, you can hang external stores on many of them, but then the stealth you just paid for is non-existent.  Weapons per tail matters.  Variety of weapons matters.  Number of aircraft I must put into the air to achieve certain objectives matters. 

3.         Sustainment ease and costs.  The last 20+ years have proven to us that stealth is extremely expensive to maintain, update, work around, and field at peak capability.  It is a cost we must pay at some level but can’t do that for the entire fleet.  Additionally, there is no such thing as a stealthy aircraft with battle damage that will return quickly to the fight.  Will never get hit, you say?  Stealth is not magic, just gives a decision-making time advantage to the user to stay ahead of the enemy’s OODA loop.  But we’ve already proven it is not invincible and invisible.  We need a large portion of the fleet that is easy to fix, easy to keep in the air, easy to service, easy to load. 

4.         Low support footprint.  Similar to #3, we need a portion of the fleet that does not need an army of ants to keep it in the air. 

5.         Use of material we have handy.  Aluminum is relatively cheap.  Aviation-grade metals are relatively cheap compared to the advanced materials.  Part of the genius and power of the United States for nearing 100 years is our industrial might.  But by using only advanced materials, we have created industrial bottlenecks that keep the majority of the nation on the bench while a few flail at reaching sufficient capacity—something which will never happen because of the scarcity of those resources and costs of handling them. 

6.         Range options.  All of the fighters in question are relatively poor when it comes to range.  F-22 is terrible.  F-35 is better but still not enough.  Some of the range extension options limit the stealth capabilities, speed capabilities, or otherwise. 

7.         Other than stealth options against identification and targeting by the enemy.  Sometimes you just want a pulling guard in front of you to run over people just off-tackle.  That makes the speedy halfback even that much more effective when trying to turn the corner on a sweep.  We have let our active electronic attack languish for so long in favor of a single technology.  A B-52 with a shield of jammers surrounding it can penetrate in some instances better than a B-2.  Additionally, all threats and targeting solutions are not radar driven.  Stealth has zero capability against infrared trackers. 

8.         Sensor fusion and integrated avionics already bought and paid for.  In 2008 when I deployed with the A-10C, it was better than any other fighter in terms of precise coordinate generation.  Additionally, the sharing of that information within the flight and with other agencies was a generational leap.  That in a 30+ year old aircraft with enough bay space to accommodate the added sensors and avionics. 

9.         Capacity employed with tactics.  We simply cannot afford, nor do we want a team of quarterbacks only.  We need an ‘all of the above’ approach.  To reach the needed capacity, we use COTS equipment, readily accessible engine technology, already-fielded aircraft, and with it all employ the ingenuity of the American mind not just in engineering, but in employment. 

Let the engineers continue to dream, and we’ll continue to break technical barriers and solve even greater problems that will keep us ahead of our enemies.  But do not use the scientific breakthroughs as a way to define requirements, capabilities and needed force structure.  It is just part of the equation.